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ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

Eleventh meeting of the Technical Preparatory Committee of the Whole

Tripoli, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
5-12 May 1990

ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

Twenty-fifth session of the Commission/ sixteenth meeting of the Conference of Ministers

Tripoli, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
15-19 May 1990

PROGRESS REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME OF ACTION FOR AFRICAN ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT

1. Since the Technical Preparatory Committee of the Whole (TEPCOW) and the Conference of Ministers last reviewed the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, 1986-1990 (UN-PAAERD), a number of activities and initiatives have been undertaken within the framework of the Programme by the United Nations Steering Committee and the United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on the Implementation of the UN-PAAERD and by the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations system. The purpose of this note is to highlight these activities.

2. Recent meetings of the United Nations Steering Committee and the United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on UN-PAAERD focused on the elaboration of a work plan to monitor and report on the implementation of the UN-PAAERD during 1989-1990 as well as the review of the first set of reports prepared under the plan. The work plan specifies, by type of activity, monitoring reports that are required from the various agencies of the United Nations system. These reports are intended to provide inputs for the final report which the Secretary-General will submit to the forty-sixth session of General Assembly on the implementation of the Programme and inform the international community of the progress made in the implementation of the UN-PAAERD. (The work plan is attached as annex I). At its tenth meeting, held in Cairo during 9 to 11 January 1990, the United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force undertook a preliminary review of 23 reports which were prepared by 12 United Nations agencies as part of the work plan. (A list of the reports is attached as annex II). These and the remaining reports will be considered in a substantive manner and in-depth by future meetings of the Task Force.

3. At the request of African countries, the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly held a debate on 17 November 1989 on the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP).[1] It will be recalled that AAF-SAP has been developed in response to the call of the General Assembly and the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole on the Mid-term Review and Appraisal of the UN-PAAERD, 1986-1990 urging that African countries should increase their efforts in the search for a viable conceptual and practical framework for economic structural adjustment programmes in keeping with the long-term development objectives and strategies at the national, subregional and regional levels".[2] Subsequent to the endorsement of AAF-SAP in April 1989 by the twenty-fourth session of the Commission/fifteenth meeting of the ECA Conference of Ministers, it was endorsed in July 1989 by the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity. At the end of the debate, the General Assembly adopted, by 137 votes to 1 vote and no abstentions, resolution A/44/L.20/Rev.1 in which it takes note with interest of AAF-SAF and "invites the international community, including the multilateral financial and development institutions, to consider the Framework as a basis for constructive dialogue and fruitful consultation".[3] While opposing the resolution, the United States welcomed the contribution AAF-

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[1] African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP), E/ECA/CM.15/6/Rev.3.

[2] General Assembly, A/RES/44/27, 17 January 1989, p.11.

[3] General Assembly Resolution A/44/L.20/Rev.1, p.2.

SAP has made to the international discussion on adjustment and further stated that "Structural adjustment is a dynamic and evolving process, and we look forward to continued productive discussions in the appropriate settings".[4]

4. The UN-PAAERD and the critical economic situation were also the subject of discussion at the ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Belgrade in September 1989. In a resolution entitled the Critical economic situation in Africa, the Heads of State or Government "expressed their serious concern at the continued deterioration of the economic and social situation in most African countries" and "also drew the attention of the international community to the fact that three years after the adoption of the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD) by the General Assembly, the international community has not yet given the appropriate support to its implementation despite vigorous and significant policy reforms pursued by African countries, which had exacted severe social and political costs."[5] The resolution, inter alia:

> "1. Urged the developed countries and the multilateral financial and development institutions not only to increase, in real terms, resource flows to Africa but also to improve the terms and conditions on which resources are distributed;
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> 2. Called upon the international community to accelerate the effective implementation of UN-PAAERD by adopting policies conductive to accelerating growth and development in African countries;
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> 3. Recommended that the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAF-SAP) should constitute a basis for constructive dialogue between African countries and their development partners in the implementation and financing of country programmes".[6]

5. A number of activities within the framework of the UN-PAAERD continued to be implemented. It will be recalled that the General Assembly at the Mid-term Review and Appraisal of the UN-PAAERD requested that "within the context of the Programme of Action, the Secretary-General of the United Nations should consult with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, other relevant organizations and interested governments with a view to establishing a group of experts to undertake an in depth assessment of the question of African commodities and the scope for export diversification."[7] The work of the High Level Expert Group which the United Nations Secretary-General subsequently established to study and prepare a report on the problems of African commodities and how to deal with them under the chairmanship of Mr.

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[4] Statement by Ambassador M. James Wilkinson, United States Representative to forty-fourth session of the General Assembly on Explanation of vote on Resolution A/144/L.30/Rev.1, Press Release USUN 150-(89), p.2.

[5] NAC 9/EC/Doc.9/Rev.3, p.1.

[6] Op.cit., p.

[7] General Assembly, RES/43/27, Op.cit., P.2.

Malcolm Fraser is still in progress. It is envisaged that the report of the Group would be ready for consideration by the current session of the ECA Conference of Ministers. It is not clear at this point of time, however, whether that will be the case.

6. The United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force published a study entitled "South African Destabilization: The Economic Cost of Front-line Resistance to Apartheid". The study assessed the devastating burden imposed on the governments and people of Southern Africa by South Africa's acts of destabilization and the responses of the countries as well as the international community in countering the impact of destabilization; and delineated, in concrete terms, the various actions that are needed from the international community to sustain recovery and development in the subregion in the face of these destabilization acts. The study was formally launched by H.E. Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, the President of Zambia and Chairman of the Front-line States, in Kitwe, Zambia on 14 October 1989. A conference on Africa's debt - jointly organized by the United Nations Steering Committee Secretariat, the American Non-Governmental Organization and the African-American Institute under the sponsorship of members of the United States Congress - was held on 13 June 1989 in Washington, D.C. The Conference discussed aspects related to links between debt, commodity prices, financial flows and development; development, debt and the private sector; and US policy on African recovery and development.

7. Following the publication of AAF-SAP, the World Bank report *Africa's Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s and ECA's Preliminary Response to the World Bank/UNDP Africa's Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s* and at the invitation of the President of the World Bank, he, the Executive Secretary of ECA, the Secretary-General of the OAU, the President of the African Development Bank, the Administrator, Deputy Administrator and Director of the Regional Bureau for Africa of UNDP, the Deputy-Director of UNICEF, the Deputy Director of the African Department of the IMF and the representative of the Director-General of DIEC met at the headquarters of the Bank on 10 May 1989 to exchange views on the serious challenges facing Africa and, particularly, the programmes being proposed to deal with them. "A Joint Statement on Africa's Long-Term Development" was issued by the participants at the end of that meeting. The statement declared that "while participants recognized that areas of disagreement remained, they emphasized their determination to work together and collaborate in the wide areas of consensus that exist. They agreed to strengthen their mechanisms to achieve that result". It is important to recall here some of the significant points of consensus made in the statement:

> "As the basic approach to adjustment issues has evolved, it has become clear that adjustment must be seen as part of a long-term development approach and that it must take full account of the human dimension. Stronger efforts are required to assure that this consensus is translated into action. ... While sustainable economic growth is imperative, it is only the means to the overarching objective of improving human welfare - for example, reducing infant mortality, increasing educational opportunity, improving health and ensuring food security. Economic adjustment must lead to the long-term improvement in the quality of life of the African people. Particular attention should be given to protecting vulnerable groups during the adjustment process, including protection of core budget expenditure on social sector programmes. Special emphasis should

be placed on employment opportunities... It was emphasized that policy reforms, whatever their form, must be relevant to specific country situations and must be designed, implemented and owned by African countries themselves".[8] (Full text of statement appears in annex III).

It was also agreed in the statement that "further steps should be taken to strengthen collaboration and the channels of communication among the Bretton Woods institutions, United Nations agencies and the African regional organizations". Within this frame, and acting on invitations by the Bank and IMF, two separate meetings took place at the end of November 1989 in Washington between staff members of ECA, the Bank and the IMF to discuss implementation of AAF-SAP, the World Bank's recent long-term perspective study on Africa, *From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, and structural adjustment programmes in Africa. Such consultations will continue in future.

8. The International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa, the third in a series of international conferences organized in relation to the implementation of the UN-PAAERD, was held in Arusha, the United Republic of Tanzania, from 12 to 16 February 1990. The highly successful conference, organized by a joint Preparatory Committee of NGOs and United Nations agencies under the auspices of the United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on the Implementation of the UN-PAAERD at the regional level, was attended by over 500 participants representing African and Northern non-governmental and grass-roots organizations, youth, women's and trade union organizations, United Nations agencies and African and Northern Governments. After five days of intensive plenary and workshop sessions discussing the theme of *Putting the People First*, the Conference culminated in the unanimous adopti on of the *African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (Arusha, 1990)*. The Charter will, in addition to being submitted to the current meeting of the ECA Conference of Ministers, be submitted to the twenty-sixth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU and the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

9. Efforts by all concerned, particularly by the United Nations System, will need to be intensified to accelerate the implementation of the UN-PAAERD during the remaining period in the life of the Programme and to continue to sensitize the international community for the need to do so. It is extremely vital that interest in and support for Africa should not wane as a result of the recent remarkable developments in Eastern Europe. While the dawn of freedom is to be welcomed, international preoccupation with Eastern Europe, particularly among major Western donors, should not be permitted to shift attention away from the needs of developing countries in general and Africa in particular. The tenth meeting of the Task Force deliberated on this issue and felt that concerns should now be raised forthrightly at every United Nations and related international meetings throughout the current and coming year to ensure that Africa's future needs are in no way put at risk. The economic situation in Africa remains to be a cause of great concern and co-operative actions and levels of international support must not falter. Indeed, the challenge in the 1990s will even be greater as development efforts and international support need to move

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[8] A Joint Statement on Africa's Long-Term Development, Press Release by the World Bank.

away from dealing with the symptoms of socio-economic malaise to concentrating on the long-term restructuring and transformation of the African economies if a process of accelerated self-sustained growth, development and equity is to be set in motion on the continent.

Annex I

UN-IATF WORK PLAN ON UN-PAAERD
MONITORING AND REPORTING ACTIVITIES, 1989-1990

	Activity	Reference
Trade		
9.1	Secretary-General's Study on African Commodities and Export Diversification (UNCTAD), UN/DIEC, UN/DIESA, UNDP, ECA IBRD, IMF, FAO, consultation with OAU	MTR para. 65 (e) para. 60
	External debt	
9.2	Status report on measures taken to alleviate Africa's debt burden, one year after the Berlin Meeting (IBRD), IMF, UNDP, UN/DIEC, UN/DIESA, UNCTAD. The joint secretariat of ECA/ADB/OAU/ACM to prepare a report as well	MTR para. 66
Resource flows		
9.3	Status reports on:	
	(i) Multilateral fund replenishments and quick-disbursement measures: reports in 1989 and again in 1990 (IBRD, IMF, IFAD, ADB)	MTR para. 63 (c)
	(ii) Bilateral flows 1988 and 1989, and measures to improve quality and rapidity: reports in 1989 and again in 1990 OECD	MTR para. 63 (a) (b) (d)
9.4	Analytical report on role of food aid in African recovery and development. (WFP), FAO, World Bank, ECA, IFAD.	MTR para. 26

9.5 [illegible] UN-PAAERD

Analysis of urgency re-allocations and increases in financial and other resources and other responses (DIEC; assigned to UN/PAAERD Steering Committee secretariat to co-ordinate) all departments and agencies.[3] MTR paras. 72,73

Co-ordination

9.6 Progress reports on:

(i) Improved co-ordination of donor programmes, enhancement of CGs and RTs
IBRD, UNDP MTR para. 63

(ii) Improved country programming by UN system
(DIEC), UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF MTR para. 74

Structural adjustment programmes and alternatives to SAPs

Progress reports on:

9.7 Social indicators for monitoring the impact of structural adjustment programmes MTR para 55 (b)
(UNDP) This is an ongoing project of UNDP, IBRD, ADB and ECA.

9.8 How structural adjustment programmes are taking social dimensions into account MTR para 55 (iii & iv)
(UNDP and IBRD). This is an ongoing project of UNDP, IBRD, ADB and ECA

9.8 (i) The impact of structural adjustment programmes on the human and social dimensions of Africa's recovery and development MTR para. 68
All agencies to report

9.8 (ii) Alternatives to structural adjustment programmes (ECA) and other agencies MTR para. 55 (c)

3/ With respect to studies on effectiveness of technical assistance in Africa, a synthesis paper was considered by the tenth meeting of IATF.

Agriculture

9.9	Progress reports on:	
(i a)	Intensified efforts for early-warning systems (FAO), UNIDO, WFP, WFC, IFAD	MTR para. 46
(i b)	National food security arrangements (FAO), UNIFEM, WFP, WFC, ECA, IFAD	MTR para. 46
(ii a)	Food production with focus on small holder agriculture (IFAD), FAO, UNIDO, UNIFEM, WFP, WFC, ECA	MTR para. 43
(ii b)	Report on processing of agricultural commodities (UNCTAD)	MTR para. 48
(ii c)	Report on agricultural investment (FAO), WFP, IFAD, ECA, World Bank	
(iii)	Strengthening capacities of African women farmers (UNIFEM/ECA), FAO, WFC, ILO, NGOs	MTR para. 47

Rehabilitation

9.10	Survey and report on progress in rehabilitation of African infrastructure in sectors supporting agriculture	UN-PAAERD paras. 11.I (b) i & ii
9.10 (a)	Food-processing and other agro-based industries (FAO), IFAD	MTR para. 48
9.10 (b)	Progress report on agro-related industries as well as other aspects of industrial rehabilitation (UNIDO)	MRT para. 48
9.10 (c)	ECA/World Bank to prepare progress report on rehabilitation of transport and communications	Minutes 9th IATF Meeting

9.10 (d)	Aspects of trade and finance are to be the responsibility of UNCTAD	Minutes 9th IATF Meeting

Environment

9.11	Assessment reports on:	
	(i) Incorporation of resource-based management in development efforts (UNEP), FAO, WFP, IFAD, ECA, UNESCO, UNIDO, NGOs	MTR para. 49
	(ii) Effectiveness of new measures to combat drought and desertification (UNSO), UNEP, FAO, IBRD, WFP, IFAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNCTAD, UNDP, NGOs	MTR para. 49

Human resources development

9.12	Receive ECA-IATF system-wide reports on Follow-up from Khartoum Conference and agree appropriate action, including mobilizing support of donor governments, NGOs, etc. (UN Inter-agency Task Force on Human Resources Development and Utilization in Africa)	MTR paras. 52,71
9.13	Comprehensive assessment of progress, problems in strengthening engagement of African women's agents of development at all levels (ECA/UNIFEM), CSDHA, ILO, DTCD, DIESA, ILO, UNFPA, UNIDO, UNESCO, NGOs	MTR para. 52

Population

9.14	Comprehensive assessment of African Population Policies and Kilimanjaro Programme of Action in relation to UN-PAAERD (UNFPA-ECA), DIESA, ECA, World Bank DTCD	MTR para. 50

Economic integration

9.15	Assessment of strengthening of co-operation and economic integration in priority sectors in the region, and international support thereof (ECA), UNDP, World Bank, ADB, UNCTAD, Other agencies; OAU	MTR paras. 60,69

South-South co-operation

9.16	Additional to appropriate coverage in reports above (including on trade), an assessment of progress, problems and opportunities in wool-related and consumer-goods industries (UNCTAD/UNDP), ECA, FAO, AFC, UNIDO	MTR para. 72

Development support communications

9.17	Regional assessment of capacities and needs in development support communications (UN-PAAERD priorities, with special emphasis on popular participation and use of communication techniques for intensified training in all sectors (UN-PAAERD secretariat), UNDP, UNICEF, ILO, FAO, UNFPA, UNESCO, UNDP	MTR para. 51

Non-governmental organizations

10.	Additional to the involvement of relevant NGOs in activities above, a report on increased co-operation of UN-ECA with their international partners in the implementation of the UN-PAAERD. (UN-PAAERD secretariat) with UN-NGLS/New York and Geneva, ILO	MTR para. 75

Annex II

TENTH MEETING OF THE UN INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UN-PAAERD

(List of documents distributed at the meeting)

I. UN-PAAERD MONITORING REPORTS

	Title	Lead agency
1.	"Development Prospects for Severely Indebted Countries and the Evolving Debt Strategy"	WORLD BANK/IMF
2.	Priority: Africa - Programme of Action proposed by the Director-General (1990-1995)	UNESCO
3.	Priority: Africa - Annex I - Main activities for which provision is made for the Africa region in the draft programme and budget for 1990-1991	UNESCO
4.	The application of the programme approach to the analysis and programming of food-processing and other agro-related industrial sub-sectors in Africa, including input industries	UNIDO
5.	Industrial rehabilitation in Africa. progress report prepared by the regional and country studies branch	UNIDO
6.	Drought and desertification in the context of the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD) 1986-1990	
7.	Implementation of UN-PAAERD: Progress report on the rehabilitation of transport and communications, 1989-1990	ECA
8.	Progress report on strengthening of co-operation and integration in priority sectors thereof	ECA

9.	Assessment of African population policies based on the Kilimanjaro Programme of Action and the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development	UNFPA
10.	Technical co-operation in Africa: Issues and concerns for improving effectiveness	WORLD BANK/UNDP
11.	Roles of food aid in Africa's recovery and development	WFP
12.	Report on food processing and other agro-based industries in Africa (1986-1990)	FAO
13.	UN-PAAERD progress report on the engagement of African women as agents of development at all levels	UNIFEM
14.	UN-PAAERD Inter-agency activities: Monitoring and reporting activities during 1989-1991 - Contribution of the technology programme	UNCTAD
15.	Progress report on UN-PAAERD: Contribution from ECDC division	UNCTAD
16.	Report on the replenishment of the African Development Fund on measures taken to increase the disbursement rate of the African Development Bank Group	ADB
17.	Recent developments in the economic integration process of developing countries	UNCTAD
18.	Review of developments in the area of trade and monetary and financial co-operation among developing countries	UNCTAD
19.	Review of development in the area of trade and monetary and financial co-operation among developing countries, annexes	UNCTAD
20.	Some areas of ECDC for new initiatives and priority attention	UNCTAD

21.	South African destabilization: The economic cost of non-line resistance to apartheid	UN-IATF/ECA

II. REPORTS ON IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, SOCIAL DIMENSION OF SAPs AND ALTERNATIVES TO SAPs

1.	Report on reckoning with the social dimensions of adjustment programmes	ADB
2.	Progress of initiatives benefiting sub-Saharan Africa	WORLD BANK/IMF
3.	Sub-Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustainable growth. A long-term perspective study	WORLD BANK
4.	Problems and issues in structural adjustment	WORLD BANK/IMF
5.	Social Development in Africa: A focus on people. Annotated outline	WORLD BANK
6.	Social development in Africa report - statistical table	WORLD BANK
7.	Social development in Africa report - country time lines	WORLD BANK
8.	Social development in Africa report - social actions country tables	WORLD BANK
9.	United Nations Development Programme regional programme for Africa - Fourth cycle. Assessment of social dimensions of structural adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa	UNDP/ADB WORLD BANK
10.	Tripartite Symposium on Structural Adjustment and Employment in Africa, Nairobi, 16-19 October 1989 - Report of the meeting	ILO
11.	Tripartite Symposium on Structural Adjustment and Employment in Africa, Nairobi, 16-19 October 1989. The challenge of adjustment in Africa	ILO
12.	ILO, structural adjustment and social dimensions. A note for the tenth meeting of the UN-IATF in the context of UN-PAAERD	ILO

13.	Agricultural labour markets and structural adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa	FAO
14.	Structural adjustment policy sequencing in sub-Saharan Africa	FAO
15.	Institutional changes in agricultural product and input markets and their impact on agricultural performance	FAO
16.	The effects of trade and exchange rate policies on production incentives in agriculture	FAO
17.	A summary of the discussion by an interregional advisory panel on "The effects, in UNESCO's field of competence, of policies and measures of financial and budgetary adjustment resulting from world economic difficulties" (Paris 6-9 March 1989)	UNESCO
18.	Debt and structural adjustment policies of developing countries. impact on economic integration	UNCTAD
19.	African alternative framework to structural adjustment programmes for socio-economic recovery and transformation (AAF-SAP)	ECA

OTHERS

1. Report of the ninth meeting of the UN-IATF on the Follow-up on the Implementation of UN-PAAERD at the Regional Level, Paris, 4-5 May 1989

2. Note on Preparations for the International Conference on Popular Participation, Arusha, the United Republic of Tanzania, 12-16 February 1990.

A JOINT STATEMENT ON AFRICA'S LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT

1. At the invitation of Mr. Barber B. Conable, President of the World Bank, the heads and senior officials of several major United Nations agencies committed to Africa's economic and social progress, as well as of the Organization for African Unity and the African Development Bank, met to discuss issues related to the region's economic recovery and long-term development. The meeting was held at World Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C., on 10 May 1989.

2. Following upon recent reports by the World Bank/UNDP and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), participants exchanged views on the serious development challenges facing Africa, and particularly on the structural adjustment programs currently being implemented by many African Governments. While participants recognized that areas of disagreement remained, they emphasized their determination to work together and collaborate in the wide areas of consensus that exist. They agreed to strengthen mechanisms to achieve that result.

3. It was emphasized that policy reforms, whatever their form, must be relevant to specific country situations and must be designed, implemented and owned by the African countries themselves. It was further noted that the process of gaining public understanding and acceptance of the need for adjustment measures and economic transformation should be as broad-based as possible within the countries concerned.

4. Among the other major points of consensus agreed upon by the participants were the following:

(a) As a basic approach to adjustment issues has evolved, it has become clear that adjustment must be seen as part of a long-term development approach and that it must take full account of the human dimension. Stronger efforts are required to assure that this consensus is translated into action. The future challenge is to assist Africa to transform the condition of its economies still threatened with stagnation and decline to sustainable growth with equity.

(b) While sustainable economic growth is imperative, it is only the means to the overarching objective of improving human welfare -- for example, reducing infant mortality, increasing educational opportunity, improving health and ensuring food security. Economic adjustment must lead to the long-term improvement in the quality of life of the African people. Particular attention should be given to protecting vulnerable groups during the adjustment process, including protection of core budget expenditures on social sector programs. Special emphasis should be placed on employment opportunities.

(c) The shortage of technical skills and weak institutions are major impediments to Africa's growth and development. Priority should be given, therefore, to human resource development and national capacity building.

(d) The sustainable development and modernization of agriculture is central to Africa's future growth. New and appropriate agricultural technologies, and effective extension services, should be pursued.

(e) Conserving Africa's natural resource base and protecting the environment are urgent priorities. No time should be lost in designing and implementing environmental action plans.

(f) The process of increasing and improving regional economic co-operation and integration in Africa should be accelerated.

(g) Promotion of the private sector is of vital importance.

5. Participants agreed that while Africa's major efforts to achieve economic growth and recovery should be recognized, the continent continues to be confronted by major problems, including weak commodity prices and terms of trade. The donor community has responded with substantial flows that are being monitored in the context of the UN-PAAERD which was established following the 1986 special session of the United Nations General Assembly. Increased donor assistance is, however, required to support the efforts of the African governments to expand their reform programs, and promote sustained economic growth. Substantial debt relief measures are needed, since the external debt burden remains a severe constraint on African development.

6. The distinctive and complementary roles of the various agencies working to support Africa's development were recognized. It was agreed that further steps should be taken to strengthen collaboration and the channels of communication among the Bretton Woods institutions, United Nations agencies and the African regional organizations. It was agreed that this process of consultation should be continued. Participants expressed appreciation to UNDP for its offer to host the next meeting. In addition, participants agreed that it would be useful to further explore issues of structural adjustment, based on studies and major reports prepared by various agencies represented at this meeting.

7. Mr. Barber B. Conable was commended by participants for his constructive initiative in convening the meeting. The exchange of views was welcomed and widely viewed as being beneficial to Africa's long-term development prospects.

8. Among those attending the meeting were Professor Adebayo Adedeji, Under-Secretary General and Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa; Dr. Bertram Collins, Co-ordinator of the Steering Committee on the United Nations Programme of Action for African Recovery and Development; Mr. William Draper III, Administrator, Mr. Arthur Brown, Associate Administrator, and Mr. Pierre-Claver Damiba, Assistant Administrator and Director of the Regional Bureau for Africa, UNDP; Mr. Richard Jolly, Deputy Director, UNICEF; Mr. Babacar N'Diaye, President, African Development Bank; Mr. Ide Oumarou, Secretary-General, Organization of African Unity; Mr. G.E. Gondwe, Deputy Director, African Department, International Monetary Fund, and Mr. David Whaley, representing the Director General for Development and International Economic Co-operation. The World Bank was represented by Mr. Barber B. Conable, President; Mr. Moeen A. Quareshi, Senior Vice President, Operations; Mr. Edward V.K. Jaycox, Vice President, Africa Region; and Mr. Stanley Fischer, Vice President and Chief Economist. The African Executive Directors to the World Bank, Messrs. Benachenhou, Funna and Milongo also attended.

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LG/NAIROBI

PREPARATIONS FOR THE FINAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME OF ACTION FOR AFRICAN ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT UN-PAAERD (1986-1990)

1. The United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD) will come to an end in 1990. The General Assembly decided, in resolution 43/27 adopted on 16 November 1988, that the final review and appraisal of the implementation of the Programme should be conducted at its forty-sixth session, to be held in 1991. Since the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly is expected to discuss and pronounce itself on the modalities and mechanisms for the final review of UN-PAAERD, the purpose of this note is to solicit the views of the ECA Conference of Ministers on this matter.

2. The tenth meeting of the United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on the Follow-up and Implementation of UN-PAAERD deliberated at length on the content of the final report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of UN-PAAERD and the modalities and mechanisms for the final evaluation and appraisal of the Programme. The Task Force approved an outline of the Secretary-General's Report, which would contain four main parts: Introduction; Performance of the African economy and impact of economic reform measures thereon; Review and evaluation of the implementation of UN-PAAERD by the international community, African countries and the United Nations system; and Conclusions and recommendations on measures to accelerate and sustain growth and development in Africa (a detailed outline is given in annex I). As in the case of the two previous reports, the draft of the final report of the Secretary-General will be prepared by the United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force and its Inter-Agency Working Group (ECA, UNDP, the World Bank, FAO and UNCTAD) would prepare the zero draft of the report.

3. The decision to have the final review and appraisal of UN-PAAERD take place in 1991 has been mainly dictated by the need to have up-to-date data and information on the implementation of the Programme up to the end of 1990. Needless to state that the co-operation of ECA member States in providing accurate and up-to-date data on the status of the implementation of the programme would be a major factor in the preparation of a credible and objective report. For this purpose, ECA will mount a major initiative at the beginning of 1991, through the use of questionnaires and country missions, to gather the necessary information from its member States. Co-operation of member States in this regard will be highly appreciated.

4. The meeting also approved proposals on mechanisms and a calendar of dates for the final review and appraisal of the implementation of UN-PAAERD. Final recommendations on these aspects will be submitted by the United Nations Secretary-General for consideration by the General Assembly at its 45th Session. The Task Force recommended that mechanisms for the final review and appraisal of the implementation of UN-PAAERD should be similar to those of the mid-term review. For this purpose, an Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the General Assembly should be established to review and appraise the implementation of UN-PAAERD and to propose measures that are needed to sustain accelerated growth and development in Africa beyond 1991. The main document for this review would be the final report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Programme. The report of the Ad Hoc Committee, which would meet in September 1991, would subsequently be considered by the 46th session of the General Assembly at a special debate on the issue (see annex II).

[illegible] The [illegible] recommendations are submitted for the consideration of the ECA Conference of Ministers. Recommendations on the modalities and mechanisms for the [illegible] review will then be made to the Secretary General on the basis of the decisions of the Conference.

Annex I

REVISED OUTLINE OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE REVIEW AND APPRAISAL OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UN-PAAERD

The terminal report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, 1986-1990 (UN-PAAERD) should provide an authoritative assessment of the extent to which the commitments entered into by all partners in UN-PAAERD have been honoured; reasons for deviation; the impact of the various actions taken; and of the measures that need to be implemented beyond 1991 to sustain growth and development in Africa. In doing this, the report should closely cross-refer to the various actions that the partners to the compact undertook to implement in UN-PAAERD. The above would require that the report should have the following structure, which would permit analysis on thematic and sectoral basis.

1. INTRODUCTION

To recall various mandates, refer to UN-PAAERD commitments, state the objectives of the report and to set the scene for the parts to follow.

2. PERFORMANCE OF THE AFRICAN ECONOMIES AND THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC REFORM MEASURES THEREON

This section should assess the performance of the African economy over the period 1986-1990 and also provide analysis of the impact of the extent to which UN-PAAERD has been implemented - in relation to the impact of other internal and external factors - on the economic performance in the region.

3. REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UN-PAAERD BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

This section should review and assess the extent to which actions that were to be undertaken by the international community and by African countries within the framework of UN-PAAERD have been implemented and should also analyse the reasons why certain commitments (if any) have not been met. The section will also review and assess the response of the United Nations system to UN-PAAERD.

4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MEASURES TO ACCELERATE AND SUSTAIN GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

This part would summarize the conclusions arrived at from the review and analysis of the preceeding sections.

Drawing on these conclusions, this section would then delineate the measures that need to be taken in the post UN-PAAERD period - both by African countries and

their partners - to bring about a process of accelerated and sustained growth and development in the African region.

The United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group (ECA, UNDP, the World Bank, UNCTAD and FAO) would - similar to previous practices - prepare the zero draft of the report. The United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force (UN-IATF) will consider and finalize the zero draft and transmit the draft report to the United Nations Steering Committee for onward transmission to the Secretary-General.

Annex II

FINAL REVIEW AND APPRAISAL OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME OF ACTION FOR AFRICAN ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT: PROPOSED MECHNAISMS AND DATES

May 1990	Proposals by the ECA Conference of Ministers to ECOSOC on the programme and mechanisms for the final review and appraisal of the implementation of UN-PAAERD.
July 1990	Consideration of and proposals by ECOSOC on the mechanisms for the final review and appraisal of UN-PAAERD.
September 1990	Consideration by the General Assembly of the mechanisms for the final review and appraisal of the implementation of UN-PAAERD.
April 1991	Review and appraisal of the implementation of UN-PAAERD by the ECA Conference of Ministers.
June/July 1991	Circulation of the Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the review and appraisal of the implementation of UN-PAAERD.
September 1991	Meeting of the Ad hoc Committee of the Whole of the General Assembly to review and appraise the implementation of UN-PAAERD.
August/September 1991	Submission of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the General Assembly.
September/December 1991	Special Debate of the General Assembly on the report and resolutions of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the General Assembly on the Final Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of UN-PAAERD and measures needed to be implemented beyond 1991 to sustain accelerated growth and development in Africa.

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TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION IN AFRICA ISSUES AND CONCERNS FOR IMPROVING EFFECTIVENESS

by

THE UNITED NATIONS INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON
UN-PAAERD

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The effectiveness of technical co-operation is now recognized as an important element in complement countries' development efforts, especially in sub-saharan Africa. Given the very thin human resource base in many African countries, relative to the demands placed on these economies, technical co-operation has a significant role to play in building Africa's institutional, policy and management capacities. However, there is growing concern that this type of co-operation has so far not helped create the capacities considered essential for sustained economic and social development in Africa. Because of this, African governments and donors in recent years have concentrated attention on analyzing the way technical co-operation is provided and used. There exists a consensus, expressed in various ways, that improvements ought to be sought.

A. Objectives

2. In response to this concern, the primary purpose of this document is to outline issues and concerns in order to lead to formulation of an agenda for action in the area of technical co-operation (TCO) as part of the follow-up to the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD). In the short term, it is intended to lend support to actions by donors to improve its effectiveness. In the long term, the goal would be to see levels of TCO gradually reduced and its composition changed in favour of actions that enhance local capacities, such as training and long-term institutional support, and the use of local consultants. During the 1990s, it is expected that the effectiveness of TCO and programmes will emerge as one of the central themes on the development agenda for sub-saharan Africa.

B. Background

3. This document was prepared at the request of the ninth meeting of the UN-PAAERD inter-agency task force. The draft of this document was reviewed by the tenth meeting of the task force, held in Geneva, from [illegible] January 1990, and comments by the task force members have been incorporated in initial version. The meeting also decided that the document should be presented to the May 1990 meeting of the ECA Conference of Ministers. It reflects the experiences of UNDP

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[1] See report of the ninth meeting of the task force, Paris, 4 and 5 May 1989, page 23. At this meeting, three papers, one each by UNDP, the World Bank and OAU/OECD were discussed. These papers form the background for this summary. For purposes of this document technical co-operation refers to development assistance by way of advisers, consulting services, training, fellowships, etc., both as part of capital projects as well as stand-alone or free-standing efforts, using the definition commonly used in UN.

and the World Bank, as the two [illegible] financiers of technical co-operation within the United Nations family, as well as the experiences of DAC/OECD, ECA and other executing agencies. ECA, as secretariat to the Task Force, was entrusted with the task of submitting the document to the policy organs of ECA and the OAU so that the African decision makers who participate in these meetings can indicate their support for changes to the manner in which technical co-operation is provided and used. It is also intended that the document will contribute to the OAU membership's continuing consideration of how to improve the technical co-operation process and the preparation of guidelines to be issued by OAU for this purpose.

4. The document draws upon various sources. First, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD held two meetings in November 1987 and 1988 concerning technical co-operation. This led to interim conclusions concerning how to improve the design and implementation of technical co-operation. More recently, the West German Development Foundation (DFD), in collaboration with DAC/OECD, sponsored a round-table meeting in Berlin in October 1989, to get reactions to the interim conclusions from participants from 20 recipient countries including 17 from Sub-Saharan Africa, and 10 other organizations. The discussions at this meeting and the [illegible] are given consideration in the document. In addition, in November/December 1988, UNDP convened four cluster meetings of African Ministers of Planning. The consolidated report of these meetings presents the Ministers' view on several issues of technical co-operation and these are also drawn on in this report.[2] Finally, the discussion of this and earlier versions of the draft report by the representatives of the various United Nations specialized agencies, who attended the ninth and tenth meetings of the UN-RAAERD Interagency Task Force, contributed valuable insights from their perspective of the problems affecting it and on areas for improvement.

Nature of the problem

5. All of these deliberations are consistent in their criticism of it and the need for improvement. Concern about the effectiveness of it has been building throughout the 1970s and there have been numerous occasions when both donors and recipients have reviewed it experiences. Several recent studies, including the document's background studies and others listed in annex 1, have examined it effectiveness and highlighted the inadequacies of it in creating and nurturing local institutions. The sheer magnitude of it funding - at least $US 1 billion disbursed each year for Sub-Saharan Africa - means that it is not negligible in coming to grips with Africa's current economic difficulties.

6. Indeed, the experiences of the past three decades of development assistance have engendered an impression - not proven in empirical terms - that the reliance on it may be counter-productive. Paradoxically, some of the assistance provided by donors to strengthen capacities may not build sound institutions, as

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[2] UNDP, Regional Bureau for Africa, Cluster Meetings of African Ministers of Planning, consolidated report of the meetings, published 1989, see pages 26-31.

originally intended, but may create distortions and undermine indigenous efforts to develop local capacities. Yet, there remain valid reasons for TC as a significant part of overall assistance to sub-Saharan Africa. While few alternatives may be immediately available - it will take considerable time and effort to build adequate capacity - more judicious use of TC, greater awareness and understanding of its effectiveness and the potential for misuse are needed by all concerned. Moreover, a long-term vision of capacity building is required for Africa in order to ensure that TC contributes to the development of local institutions.[3]

II. TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION CHARACTERISTICS

A. Magnitude of technical co-operation

7. Examining TC is difficult and falls quite short of any degree of accuracy. There is a lack of a single data base that includes data on all TC, and which is presented on the basis of coherent definitions. The annual Development Co-operation Report, published by the Chairman of DAC, provides data on aid flows from its 17 donor member countries and also includes data from multilateral and some other sources. However, while probably representing the bulk of such assistance, some provided by other sources is not included. Other information, such as data from the annual Development Co-operation Reports prepared on a country-by-country basis by UNDP, varies in terms of the availability of donor data. Statistics suffer from the need to often convert data from a donor's particular fiscal year basis to a calendar year basis. Definitions used in establishing data bases also vary. The effect of these factors is to make it difficult to establish with any degree of certainty the magnitude of total assistance provided and the amount received by particular countries. The same factors make it difficult to separate accurately TC from other forms of assistance. Both the DAC and UNDP are seeking improvements in this area but, for the present time, it must be understood that any quantitative examination and analysis of TC rests on less than a firm base.

8. As shown in annex II, available OECD statistics[4] estimate disbursement of TC grants to sub-Saharan Africa at about $US 3 billion per year in 1987. This is an increase of 10 per cent over the 1986 figure and a 50 per cent increase over the level reported in 1984. These amounts exclude TC which is part of capital assistance (investment projects), volunteers, NGOs and government-financed TC. Not only is a significant portion of TC not included in these statistics, official figures are likely to underestimate actual amounts: data collected by UNDP at the country level indicate that actual levels of TC disbursements tend to be much higher than reported OECD figures - some times by

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[3] See World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long-term Perspective Study (1989).

[4] These statistics include data from the 17 donor country members of OECD.

a factor of two.[5] The amount of $US 3 billion, therefore, very likely underestimates the current volume of TC that is provided to sub-Saharan Africa by a wide margin.

9. Even this low estimate is staggering. Put into perspective, the current level of TC to sub-Saharan Africa is equivalent to about 25 per cent of annual net ODA disbursements. This is roughly twice as great as the total net flows from the World Bank on its own and 10 times as great as UNDP's assistance to Africa. As evident from the data presented below, the impact on many of the small countries in sub-Saharan Africa is particularly significant while the larger countries - notably Nigeria - seem to be less touched by TC.

10. When analyzed on the basis of population and public expenditures on other development activities, the amount spent on TC becomes even more pronounced. On average, based on DAC and UNDP statistics, at least $US 6 per capita is spent on TC in sub-Saharan Africa each year. (Not weighted by population, TC is an average of $US 19 per capita across 43 African countries, with a median amount of about $US 12 per capita in 1987). This compares to average central government expenditures in that same year of about $US 9 to 10 per capita on education and about $US 2 to 3 per capita on health by African Governments. In some cases, the amount per capita is exceedingly large - for example, the figures for small countries like Cape Verde and Seychelles are over $US 90 per capita - while in Nigeria the amount is only $US 0.50 per capita.

11. Although there are no accurate statistics on the number of persons involved, one recent study[6] puts the total number of advisers and consultants financed under TC programmes in sub-Saharan Africa at 80,000 non-nationals. This is roughly equivalent to the 70,000 high-level sub-Saharan Africans who are thought to be settled in EEC countries. Migration of highly skilled manpower out of Africa in the period 1985-1987 is estimated to have increased to about 23,000 per year. While TC does not necessarily offset the out-migration of skilled Africans, these figures demonstrate that there is a significant imbalance between the potential employment of highly qualified Africans in their home countries and their actual utilization. The high levels of TC may, in part, be a result of this imbalance.

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[5] These data are collected as part of NATCAPs and/or preparation of annual Development Co-operation Reports at the country level.

[6] Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Technical Assistance Personnel Financed by the Nordic Countries, by Kim Forss, et.al.; a study commissioned by DANIDA, FINNIDA, MCD/NORAD and SIDA, March 1988.

B. Geographic and sectoral distribution [7]

12. The available data on TC disbursements show certain geographic and demographic features. As noted above, African countries with small populations - such as Cape Verde, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Comoros - receive the largest amount of TC on a per capita basis while large countries such as Nigeria and Ethiopia receive relatively low amounts of TC per capita. Significant programmes (over $US 100 million per year) exist in Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, Somalia, the Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia, with the single largest programme in the United Republic of Tanzania at over $US 180 million in 1987. Ethiopia was second with $US 146 million in 1987. Yet, there does not seem to be a strong correlation with income levels: that is, lower income countries do not receive commensurately more TC per capita than richer countries. In terms of sectoral distribution, TC tends to be heavily concentrated in agriculture, education and health although the share of health is not as high as might be expected given the priority that this sector is accorded in most development programmes. The majority of African countries had at least half of their TC in these three sectors. The next most significant area is transport and communications. Overall, industry seems to receive very little TC.

C. TC and recipient economies

13. In some countries, TC accounts for a very significant share of total official development assistance received. While the average for the region as a whole is 25 per cent of net ODA flows, the range is considerable - from 10 per cent in Zimbabwe and 11 per cent in Ghana and Mozambique to 43 per cent in Swaziland and Gabon and a high of 66 per cent in Benin and followed by 69 per cent in Nigeria (largely because Nigeria receives very little ODA for other purposes). In Gabon, Swaziland, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cameroon, Seychelles, Comoros and Lesotho, TC as a percentage of total aid ranged from 35 to 44 per cent. For 10 countries, there was a significant increase of TC as a portion of total aid between 1984 and 1987 (Benin, Chad, Comoros, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe).

14. TC can also constitute an important element of the affected local economies. In 1987, there were at least 14 countries that had TC flows equivalent to more than 5 per cent of GNP; 24 countries between 2 and 5 per cent; and 12 countries with less than 2 per cent. Again, small countries are most affected. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, TC was a high of 23 per cent of GNP, followed by Cape Verde at 16 per cent and the Gambia at 10 per cent.

15. In terms of government expenditure, there are instances of extreme dependence: in Chad, for example TC was the equivalent of 64 per cent of total budget expenditures and in Burkina Faso, 45 per cent. On the other hand, TC was

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[7] The data in this section are based on annex II, which is drawn from the UNDP report cited in footnote 6.

the equivalent of only 3 to 4 per cent of total budget expenditures in the case of Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire and Gabon and it was from 5 to 6 per cent in Ghana, Zaire and Kenya. In Nigeria, in particular, TC is a negligible share of the economy and government expenditures.

D. Nature of TC provided

16. Available statistics do not break down total TC from all sources into its component parts and it is, therefore, not possible to analyse the nature of TC provided in global terms. Most TC entails a combination of long-term resident advisers, short-term consultants' studies, training (seminars, study tours and fellowships) plus minor amounts of equipment (vehicles, computers and office equipment). Few TC programmes include operating funds for the beneficiary agencies. Based on field experience, it is likely that the majority of TC is in the form of long-term resident advisers more than short-term consultants. Relatively few of these advisers are thought to be from developing countries (under South-South programmes). The use of local consultants is similarly relatively low but growing.

17. Some detailed information on the make-up of UNDP's and the World Bank's TC activities is available. An examination of these experiences show that the composition of TC programmes may be evolving. In the case of UNDP, just over half of its TC was in the form of long-term experts, with the share of these long-term advisers dropping slightly between UNDP's third and fourth Programming Cycles. Roughly two-thirds of UNDP's total TC is for advisory services (both long and short term). Formal training accounted for about 10 per cent of UNDP's assistance to Africa in 1988 but is projected to increase to about 14 per cent for the 1988/1991 period. However, the primary feature of TC is the transfer of skills which is ensured through on-the-job training. In the case of the World Bank, about 60 per cent of the total TC financed under World Bank projects in the past two years (based on approvals) was for experts and advisers, only a part of which is long term in nature. The ratio of short-term consultants to long-term advisers in a selected number of projects where data on person-months were available was 2:1, indicating that the vast majority of funds provided by the World Bank for TC is of a short-term nature. Training accounts for about 20 to 25 per cent, with the balance for specialized engineering and technical studies.

18. Another significant feature of TC, particularly of those programmes financed and executed through the United Nations development system, is the traditional tripartite nature inherent in collaboration among recipient government, agency of execution, usually one of specialized/executing agencies of the United Nations and UNDP providing the source of funding. As the nature of TC changes with greater use of national execution, the tripartite relationship will require modification with respect to the various roles of the parties.

19. A significant issue is the share of TC funds utilized for training. As noted above, that share has been between 20 and 25 per cent of the total for the Bank and 10 and 15 per cent for UNDP. UNDP's efforts amount to about $US 40 million spent on training in 1988 while the World Bank has approved some $US 60 million each year for training in the African region. Yet, this is low compared

to other regions: in the case of Asia, for example, as much as 45 per cent of the World Bank's financing of TC is for training. Another important development in the case of Africa is the fact that an increasing portion of training funds finance programmes at local and regional training institutions plus study tours, mainly in other developing countries, as a complement to long-term fellowships often in developed countries. In terms of cost effectiveness, it is estimated that the former type of training could cost one-tenth the amount per trainee as compared to typical overseas fellowships.

III. ISSUES AND CONCERNS

20. This document is not intended to reiterate the conclusions of previous reports on the effectiveness of TC but to highlight the most important concerns for the attention of policy makers in Africa and their donor partners. It is important that, in this age of austerity and cost consciousness on the part of donors and African Governments alike, African Governments seized the opportunity offered by the initiatives being taken by donors at the level of DAC/OECD and the follow-up to the UN-PAAERD to voice their concerns - TC has simply become too important to ignore. Not only are the direct costs of TC considerable, but also the hidden costs of ineffective TC are many times more significant.

21. As elaborated in more detail in the reviews carried out by UNDP, the Bank and other donors, there are a number of issues confronting TC programmes from both the side of the donors and the side of the recipients. Many of these issues concern complex socio-political, cultural and even psychological factors that are hard to isolate and to control, compounding the difficulties of designing and managing TC programmes. It is important to remember that TC can be effective: past reviews have shown that there are a number of key elements for successful TC, such as strong client commitment, appropriate institutional development design, competent staffing and an enabling environment to ensure sustainability. To the extent that these elements are missing in current TC programmes, the likelihood of success is reduced.

A. Quality of technical co-operation programmes

22. One of the most fundamental issues affecting TC is the overall quality of these programmes. There are a number of specific concerns, starting with the lack of a strategic vision for these programmes and definition of what they are intended to achieve. The objectives of these efforts are often not clear: the institutional development goals supported by TC are difficult to define and, subsequently, to monitor and evaluate. Because of these difficulties, long-term goals are frequently sidestepped by donors and beneficiaries, with attention focusing on gap filling and substitution in order to achieve the successful physical implementation of development projects. Objectives, moreover, can often come in conflict and, when a choice is to be made between objectives, the long-term IU objectives tend to be sacrificed.

23. Thus, TC projects all too frequently fail to realize their objectives and have limited impact. This results from inadequate project preparation and design, and lack of careful and realistic definition of objectives. As perceived

by many recipients - a self-criticism shared by some donors - donor agencies are often seen not to apply as rigorous criteria to TC projects as to capital investment projects. This lack of rigour is then made more serious because monitoring and evaluation of TC projects has often been weak due to the lack of adequate instruments and methodologies.

24. These issues have now been recognized and steps are being taken to resolve them: the quality of TC programmes was a major focus of attention at the November 1986 DAC meeting on technical co-operation. The tentative conclusions of that meeting are being further elaborated and will provide guidelines for improving the TC process among the donor community. The same issues arose in the criticisms of TC expressed by the African Ministers of Planning in the UNDP-sponsored Cluster Meetings. At the October 1987 OSC and DAC/OECD round-table meeting on technical co-operation, similar views were expressed. Specific areas cited as requiring more work were evaluation methodologies, training and increasing donor sensitivity and appreciation of socio-political and cultural issues.

B. Donor interests

25. Besides the concerns about the quality of TC programmes, there are aspects of donor policies that can lead to supply driven TC, that is, TC programmes motivated by the special interests of donors and not by the mutually agreed needs of recipients. As noted above, priority may be given to ensuring the successful physical implementation of development projects by employing nationals of the donor country. This may be because of (a) a fear of misuse of funds if there is not an external adviser or project manager controlling project expenditures; (b) a concern that local technical capacities are not strong enough to deal with complex issues especially in focusing on technology transfer; (c) a desire on the part of the donor to have an insider well placed within a recipient country to pursue the donor's broader political and economic concerns; or (d) the convenience of having someone on site with whom to communicate easily and to act as an interface with local administrations on a day-to-day basis. It should be noted, however, that donors are often advocating change through TC programmes and that this change may be resisted.

26. To the extent that TC is, in fact, supply driven, this obviously leads to duplication among donors and use of foreign consultants/advisers where local staff may be adequate for the assignment. Moreover, TC funds especially from bilateral sources are often tied and the availability of financing for personnel of the donor country can mean that capable Africans are bypassed in favour of donor nationals.

C. Recipient constraints

27. The demand by recipient countries for TC can be motivated by their own particular interests and constraints. Officials may turn to foreigners in place of their own nationals and other Africans for a variety of political and even personal reasons; the supposed objectivity of foreign advisers can enhance their effectiveness and acceptability in some complex socio-political settings as they

may be seen as more discrete on particularly sensitive policy issues. This may be particularly true if conflict of interest could arise with nationals involved. Personal gain from dealing with foreign consulting firms may be another factor that reduces the share of TC programmes going to local consultants. Some recipients, like donors, also see foreign advisers as an easy way of communicating with donors: foreigners can act as an interpreter and facilitator on behalf of the recipients and handle directly with donors many issues that arise during the course of project implementation. The issues of cross-cultural management mean that it may simply be easier for both donors and recipients to have a third party function as an intermediary.

28. The attraction of foreign advisers is further enhanced if these advisers are well equipped with vehicles, computers and office equipment and supplies. Given the scarcity of operating funds - the greater part of public operating expenditures is often used to pay for salaries - the availability of these facilities makes TC much more appealing to recipients. However, a key issue, too often ignored by both donors and recipients, is how recurrent costs related to the activities set in motion by TC will be defrayed after donor involvement in project operations is terminated. The need for a joint and realistic assessment of the recipient's ability to meet the recurrent costs over time, and for including it in the recipient government's planning and budgetary processes to ensure sustainability, is increasingly called for by all parties who expect effective utilization of it and require an acceptable return on investment.

29. Finally, there is a more fundamental dilemma faced in many African governments. The pay scales and working conditions in the public sector are often so poor that competent local staff are not attracted to the positions. Only by securing financing from donors to engage foreign advisers or perhaps for "topping off" salaries and providing other benefits for nationals working on the project can African managers hope to have the expertise needed to get done the tremendously important jobs assigned to them. In the short run, it may be easier for governments to engage foreigners than it is for them to develop a compensation policy that offers adequate incentive for skilled and experienced local staff. To pay, in fact, be disguised budgetary support for selected, routing functions of government operations.

30. Not only are competent Africans not attracted to the civil service, the so-called counterparts to the foreign advisers - who are to be trained to take over the job at the end of the project - may be so poorly equipped and/or motivated that there is very little chance that any transfer of knowledge will take place. The keen counterparts who go back from the project are then unlikely to stay in the public sector, undermining the sustainability of whatever was initially achieved.

31. Making TC more effective and enhancing the sustainability of these operations requires public sector reforms to overcome the serious problems of incentives and public finances within bloated and inefficient civil service structures. Overall, because of serious systemic deficiencies in management structures and processes, effective on-the-job training of counterparts is

hampered and much institution building will continue to be ineffective as long as these deficiencies in the public sector persist.

32. During the cluster meetings of the African Ministers of Planning, the participants clearly expressed some of the main criticisms that are levelled at technical co-operation:

(a) Even though technical co-operation has been provided to African Governments for several decades, its impact in terms of lasting capacity of national institutions has been markedly insufficient;

(b) Within African Governments the structures in charge of co-ordinating and managing technical co-operation are usually weak and insufficiently staffed;

(c) As a result of the situation described above, planning, programming and implementation of technical co-operation is donor-driven. Recipient governments tend to accept it at times as the price to pay to receive capital aid or as a means to finance their own recurrent budgets through TC projects. Duplications and redundancies of technical assistance are a direct consequence of this lack of government co-ordination and programming;

(d) Technical co-operation is extremely costly. The remuneration of an expatriate expert may be a multiple by 100 or more of his counterpart's salary. As a result, the total cost of technical co-operation is, in the case of certain African countries, comparable to the wage bill of the whole public sector even though the number of expatriate experts is only a fraction of the number of civil servants. In addition, technical co-operation has "hidden costs" for the recipient country (for instance counterpart staff, housing, transport) which can add up to a significant percentage of the recipient government's budget;

(e) Assignment of counterpart staff by recipient governments has proved difficult. Budgetary constraints and freezes on recruitment in the public sector, generally associated with stabilization and adjustment programmes, have contributed to this problem in recent years;

(f) Constraints on recruitment in the public sector have also prevented an adequate staffing of certain key government institutions, in spite of the availability of the qualified nationals and, even of unemployment among the graduates and post-graduates. This, in turn, has led donors to provide expatriate assistance to reinforce these governmental structures, thus leading to a paradoxical situation where technical assistants carry out responsibilities that could be discharged by qualified, unemployed nationals;

(g) Technical co-operation has been provided, as a rule, on a project-by-project basis, without a sectoral or national framework;

(h) Training efforts do not always address the priority needs of the country since these are not systematically identified;

examples cited below are not necessarily all inclusive but reflect major actions underway.

37. In their review of technical co-operation, the African Ministers of Planning in the cluster meetings put forward the following recommendations:

(a) The objectives of technical assistance projects should be emphasized as being to build radiply national capacities in the relevant areas, thus reducing the dependency of the country on technical assistance;

(b) Technical assistance programmes should make greater use of national experts, as well as experts from African or other developing countries;

(c) UNDP should assist African Governments in establishing a data bank on national expertise to plan more effective the training and use of national human resources;

(d) African consultancy capacities should be strengthened;

(e) The costs of technical co-operation should be reviewed, and should be financed through grants as far as possible;

(f) Recipient governments should have the right, and be provided with the financial means, to interview prospective candidates for expert posts;

(g) Nationals must be provided with properly defined job descriptions, incentives, training and experience sufficient to ensure that they sustain activities with the same efficiency after the departure of the expatriate experts;

(h) In consultation with Governments, UNDP should develop a strategy to stem the deteriorating technical assistance due to increased utilization of young, insufficient experienced experts;

(i) UNDP should review the [illegible] of improving the current distribution of resources between technical assistance and equipment;

(j) At the completion of the [illegible] projects, their equipment should be transferred to the national institutions where these projects are located;

(k) The NAICAR guidelines should be completed as soon as possible and introduced in a statement [illegible] and [illegible] as appropriate;

(l) The NAICAR [illegible] should be [illegible] and implemented that subsequent cycles can be carried out by recipient Governments;

(m) As envisaged, NAICAR should be extended at their request to other African countries, irrespective of whether they have adopted a structural

adjustment programme. UNDP should develop and disseminate information on NAICAPs to permit cross-fertilization among countries;

(h) The establishment of a data base technical co-operation should be adequately stressed in the implementation of the NAICAP cycle;

(i) Management systems and structures should be the subject of intensive examination in the NAICAP cycle; and

(j) UNDP should, in the course of NAICAP exercises, assist the African countries in establishing or strengthening national structures responsible for programming, managing and monitoring technical co-operation.

3. Technical co-operation planning and co-ordination

38. Two recent programmes to improve donor co-ordination and planning of TC interventions have come about at the initiative of UNDP, as highlighted below:

(a) Under UNDP's 1989, donor co-ordination of TC is being improved by including TC on the agenda of round-tables and consultative group meetings, the latter in collaboration with the World Bank. For those meetings, a separate paper [illegible] activities TC being prepared by UNDP and discussed; and

(b) NAICAPs are being undertaken with [illegible] assistance for a growing number of countries (i.e., there are [illegible] to assist recipient countries in defining their own policies, priorities and programmes for technical co-operation and in identifying measures needed to strengthen [illegible] management. As part of the NAICAP process, UNDP is working with governments in the preparation of Technical Co-operation Policy Framework Papers (TCPFPs). These papers constitute the basic statement of a government [illegible] and are thus presented in the form of a separate technical co-operation programme [illegible] to the donor community at a [illegible] or round-table meetings. Through this process, the collective [illegible] more informed consultation and improved management [illegible] United Nations specialized agencies [illegible] through sector reviews [illegible] building blocks in the [illegible].

4. African consultancy capacity

39. [illegible] the World Bank [illegible] are currently collaborating to prepare a programme of support to develop local consulting capacities in Africa. The strengthening of these capacities is expected to facilitate the use of African consultants in development programmes, instead of relying on foreign advisers and consultants. [illegible] feature of this programme is the direct involvement of public and private consulting organizations in the design of the programme. Working through existing associations or encouraging their creation, Africa-wide and nationally, the programme has so far been able to reach a large number of firms and individuals in seven countries. Those associations have been instrumental in organizing consultants and could prove to be effective in

establishing inventories of qualified consultants, ensuring good responses to requests from donors for consulting proposals, and formulating consortia for undertaking consulting assignments. In that way, associations could play an effective role as interlocutor for donors to reach African consultants. Donor support is needed for the [illegible] of the [illegible] programmes in at least seven selected countries as well as for expanding the programmes to other countries.

40. In parallel to developing these local capacities, an additional objective is to alter current donor policies and practices with regard to the eligibility of local consultants to be awarded contracts for consulting services under externally financed development projects. Certain donors, notably the African Development Bank, already have adopted measures to provide an incentive for the selection of African consultants while others have more restrictive policies. To the extent possible, more flexibility would be sought on the part of donors at least to put African consultants on an equal footing in terms of eligibility with nationals of the country providing the financing.

D. Capacity for policy analysis and economic management

41. The World Bank [illegible] the [illegible] donors and African governments a specific initiative aimed at capacity building in the area of policy analysis and economic management. [illegible] the objective of this initiative is to build institutions, at national and regional levels and within governments, that are capable of training [illegible] analysts and managers, advising governments on policy questions and undertaking research on macro-economics and other important public policy questions, particularly from a cross-sectoral, multidisciplinary perspective. These [illegible] would also constitute the forum for exchanging [illegible] and [illegible] practices in understanding the policy process, especially [illegible] the academic community and the private sector. The goal is to reduce the need for external advice [illegible] this important area by greatly enhancing the effectiveness of TC to such institutions and co-ordinating and rationalizing [illegible] of concerted and sustained support that is required [illegible] these institutions to flourish. By establishing the [illegible] mechanisms, it is hoped that African [illegible] in defining priorities and policies and in administering [illegible] programmes. [illegible] this initiative is high and it is anticipated that, over time, the approach could be expanded or replicated in other important areas.

E. Establishing goals and monitoring performance

42. As set out above, the agenda for changing the way in which TC programmes are handled by donors and recipients is large and it will take a considerable period of time to redirect ongoing programmes and to reorient existing policies and practices. Habits from the past will not easily or readily be altered in favour of more effective, but perhaps more time-consuming and costly, approaches. Moral suasion on the part of the DAC, through the adoption of the interim conclusions, and multilateral organizations such as UNDP and the World Bank, through their leadership in the consultative process with donors, will be

essential. Recipients governments, on their side, must also be vigilant in seeing that donors adhere to the guidelines once they are approved by donors.

43. For this to take place, concomitant actions are needed in order to ensure that the entire development community is fully informed of TC programmes. This will necessitate an enhanced level of reporting by donors and recipients including the following:

(a) Accurate and comprehensive data [illegible] on the actual level of TC and its composition;

(b) Additional details, in accordance with agreed definitions, on TC programmes to enable [illegible];

(c) Improved methodologies and approaches to TC evaluation which can be shared more widely with donors and recipients; and

(d) More frequent exchanges [illegible] experiences.

44. It must, furthermore, be recognized that the financing recommendations could remain at the level of [illegible] from commitments by donors to certain targets [illegible] changes [illegible]. Concrete recommendations should be made [illegible] that these recommendations are, indeed, translated into effective [illegible] measures that could be adopted include the following:

(a) The share of long-term resident advisers in total TC programmes should decrease in the coming years in favour of an increase in short-term consultants and/or non-resident advisers who visit the recipient periodically; the target could be fixed at from one-third to one-half of total TC;

(b) The amount of training explicitly provided for in TC programmes (excluding training on-the-job [illegible]) should be increased substantially; the target [illegible] per cent of the total;

(c) The share of [illegible] consultants, [illegible] under TC programmes should increase [illegible] per cent to 15 to 25 per cent; and

(d) National executing [illegible] management [illegible] programmes directly by the concerned recipients, instead of by the financing donor or a selected executing agency, should be increased. The target level [illegible] such execution would vary depending on current donor practice; in the case of UNDP, it would rise from 5 per cent to 10 to 15 per cent, and beyond over time.

V. CONCLUSIONS

45. As the UN-PAAERD comes to a close, it is important for African Governments to pursue the issues and concerns expressed in this document. The actions and initiatives described in the document are positive responses for dealing with, or beginning to deal with, some of these issues. However, these in their own right will not be sufficient unless considerably more emphasis is placed on those areas of weakness: for example, education and training; women both as beneficiaries and partners in TC activities; inclusion of TC in country planning and budgetary processes; consideration of the recurrent costs related to TC projects during the period of donor involvement and after; and analysis of availability of local persons to do required work before deciding on TC with expatriate advisers. All of these steps, moreover, must be placed in the context of strategies aimed at long-term capacity building and policy reform to increase effective utilization of existing human resources in sub-Saharan Africa.

Annex I(a)

GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

Data reporting and monitoring

Rigorous mechanisms should be established with a specific view to assessing the effectiveness of TC, regardless of source.

Evaluation methodologies

Various bilateral and multilateral donor agencies and institutions in consultation with recipient governments should jointly undertake research on developing methodologies and evaluation techniques on TC effectiveness.

Capacity building

To advance more fundamental changes in TC effectiveness, donors should give priority to capacity-building initiatives, particularly those aimed at: (a) increased use of national consultants; (b) regional management training institutions; and (c) policy analysis and economic management.

Use of national consultants

Donors should specifically commit themselves to making their financing more fungible and increasing the use of national consultants in their development programmes.

Public sector reform

African Governments, with the support of the donor community, should not relent in their current efforts towards public sector reforms, especially those that address staffing and incentives in the civil service, expenditure management, and overall management improvements.

Technical co-operation planning and programming

The World Bank and UNDP, in particular, should focus on improvement in the programming and budgeting of TC, transparency and consistency on the budgetary implications (especially regarding donor supplements) and governmental structures for management of TC programmes (through SAPLAPs, etc.); and

Increased consultation

Finally, African Governments and donors should, as soon as possible, enter into dialogue and exchange views on TC; commitment by both donors and recipients is required to effect lasting change. UNDP should take the lead in sponsoring a series of meetings on these issues.

A view to the future

In the cluster meetings, the African Ministers of Planning concluded that progress is occurring towards having better-focused TC with the donors converging on real needs. The programming of TC has been strengthened and is starting to benefit from NATCAPs and the Technical Co-operation Policy Framework Papers prepared as part of the NATCAP process. The Ministers noted that one of the main objectives of the NATCAPs must be to prepare for the replacement of expatriate technical assistance by nationals within a reasonable period of time. This should bring an end to the continuing dependence of the countries' management on foreign expertise and make room for other forms of development assistance. NATCAPs must therefore stimulate the development of national expertise; it should also encourage South-South and particularly Intra-African co-operation.

[illegible]
[illegible]

Annex [illegible]
TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION IN AFRICA

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Annex I(c)

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Table 1. Selected data on national income, 1970

Country/year	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Africa				
1970	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1975	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1980	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Ghana				
1970	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1975	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1980	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Liberia				
1970	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1975	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1980	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Nigeria				
1970	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1975	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1980	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Sierra Leone				
1970	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1975	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1980	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Togo				
1970	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1975	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1980	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Cameroon				
1970	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1975	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1980	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Cape Verde				
1970	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1980	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1985	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Central African Republic				
1970	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1980	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1985	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

Table 2. (Continued)

Classification		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Chad					
	1981	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1982	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1983	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Comoros					
	1981	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Congo					
	1981	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Ethiopia					
	1981	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Gambia					
	1981	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Ghana					
	1981	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

Table [illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]				
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[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]				
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]				
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]				
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
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[illegible]				
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
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[illegible]				
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]				
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[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Mali				
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Mauritania				
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible]

Table I. (continued)

Country/Year	Total $ M	Total $ Mid	% Total Mid	% Increase
Sudan				
1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1985	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Swaziland				
1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1985	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Tanzania				
1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1985	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Togo				
1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1985	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Uganda				
1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1985	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Zaire				
1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1985	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Zambia				
1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1985	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Zimbabwe				
1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1985	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

Source: OECD Geographic Distribution of Financial Flows 1984/85; World Bank: WDR 1988

Table II: Some economic indicators and technical cooperation in Africa

Country/year		GNP $ million	Total $ GNP	Population million	Gyc per capita $	TC per capita $
ANGOLA						
	1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
	1987					
BENIN						
	1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
BOTSWANA						
	1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
BURKINA FASO						
	1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
BURUNDI						
	1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
CAMEROON						
	1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
CAPE VERDE						
	1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.						
	1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]

Table II: (continued)

Country/year		GNP $ million	Total % GNP	Population million	GNP per capita $	TC per capita $
CHAD						
	1984	310	5.69	4.30		3.84
	1986	810	5.68	3.15	300	8.94
	1987	960	5.40	5.40		9.77
COMOROS						
	1984	110	8.55	0.44		21.41
	1986	160	6.50	0.47	320	28.87
	1987	200	5.70	0.40		48.50
CONGO						
	1984	2,070	1.66	1.82		18.95
	1986	1,625	2.36	1.54	990	19.87
	1987	1,890	2.56	2.00		24.20
COTE D'IVOIRE						
	1984	5,070	0.97	9.90		5.97
	1986	8,660	1.01	10.70	550	8.14
	1987	9,110	0.83	11.10		7.10
EQUATORIAL GUINEA						
	1984			0.37		18.34
	1986			0.38		20.41
	1987			0.40		16.80
ETHIOPIA						
	1984	4,810	1.68	42.17		4.92
	1986	5,200	2.22	43.50	120	2.66
	1987	5,020	2.91	44.80		3.27
GABON						
	1984	3,290	0.91	0.95		31.47
	1986	3,010	1.10	1.04	3,080	34.74
	1987	3,060	1.50	1.00		30.90
The GAMBIA						
	1984	200	7.40	0.72		20.47
	1986	170	19.12	0.77	230	42.10
	1987	210	10.19	0.80		26.75
GHANA						
	1984	4,350	0.58	12.31		2.06
	1986	5,390	0.70	13.13	390	2.97
	1987	1,940	0.93	13.60		3.36

Table II: (continued)

Country/year		GNP million	Total $ U.S.	Population million	GNP per capita $	TU per capita $
GUINEA						
	1984	1,810	0.07	6.02		2.9[illegible]
	1986	1,[illegible]	1.[illegible]	6.[illegible]	200	1.1[illegible]
	1987	2,060	1.[illegible]	6.[illegible]		2.4[illegible]
GUINEA-BISSAU						
	1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		1.[illegible]
	1986	360	[illegible]	[illegible]	110	24.[illegible]
	1987		[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
KENYA						
	1984	[illegible]	6.94	19.[illegible]		[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	2.[illegible]	21.[illegible]	300	[illegible]
	1987	[illegible]	1.[illegible]	22.[illegible]		[illegible]
LESOTHO						
	1984	[illegible]	4.[illegible]	1.[illegible]		22.59
	1986	540	7.21	1.59	[illegible]	24.64
	1987	640	6.06	1.60		24.25
LIBERIA						
	1984	980	2.94	2.1[illegible]		1[illegible].51
	1986	1,010	3.16	[illegible].28	400	15.[illegible]
	1987	1,060	2.97	2.30		15.70
MADAGASCAR						
	1984	2,240	1.[illegible]	9.89		[illegible]
	1986	2,490	2.41	10.[illegible]	230	[illegible]
	1987	1,[illegible]	3.21	10.90		[illegible].20
MALAWI						
	1984	1,[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible].81
	1986	1,180	3.80	[illegible]	160	[illegible]
	1987	1,2[illegible]	4.48	[illegible]		[illegible]
MALI						
	1984	1,[illegible]	5.80	[illegible]		8.[illegible]
	1986	1,540	5.78	[illegible]	180	11.0[illegible]
	1987	1,[illegible]	4.19	[illegible]		11.10
MAURITANIA						
	1984	680	4.60	1.[illegible]		18.87
	1986	780	5.62	1.74	420	23.24
	1987	8[illegible]	[illegible].40	1.90		21.[illegible]

Table II: (continued)

Country year	GAP $ million	TOTAL $ 0.5	Population million	GA per capita $	GP per capita $
MAURITIUS					
1983	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
1985	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
CAMEROON					
1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
1985	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]					
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]					
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
1985	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]					
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
SENEGAL					
1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
1985	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
SEYCHELLES					
1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
SIERRA LEONE					
1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
1985	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
SOMALIA					
1985	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1987			[illegible]		[illegible]

Table II. (continued)

Country/year		GNP $ million	Total % GNP	Population million	GNP per capita	TC per capita $
The SUDAN						
	1984	[illegible]	1.80	[illegible]		[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
SWAZILAND						
	1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
TANZANIA						
	1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1987			[illegible]		[illegible]
TOGO						
	1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		10.17
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	13.48
	1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		13.42
UGANDA						
	1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1987			[illegible]		[illegible]
ZAIRE						
	1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
ZAMBIA						
	1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
ZIMBABWE						
	1984	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
	1986	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	1987	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]

Source: OECD Geographic Distribution of Financial Flows 1984/87;
World Bank: WDR 1988.

Annex III

PRINCIPLES FOR TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

The Development Assistance Committee [illegible] at a meeting on November 1965, reviewed the [illegible] in the [illegible] with a focus on technical co-operation management and co-ordination and on policies on personnel and delivery access. The following note reflects the preliminary conclusions of this meeting. A Seminar on Technical Co-operation to be organized by the German Development Foundation in Berlin in October 1969 will provide an opportunity to obtain informally the views of technical assistance managers from developing countries. The DAC will pursue its work on technical co-operation principles in [illegible]. Matters to be explored further include criteria for salary supplementation, the role of technical co-operation as an integral part of sector assistance and improved co-ordination of technical [illegible], including the role of UNDP in this regard.

PRINCIPLES FOR TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

1. Technical co-operation is an essential element of development co-operation. Considerable resources are [illegible] committed to [illegible] purpose by [illegible] and multilateral [illegible]. [illegible] were allocated to technical co-operation [illegible] by DAC countries bilateral [illegible]. The importance of technical co-operation will increase still further in the future. [illegible] a high degree of adaptability and creativity as well as flexibility towards new [illegible] to cope with the multiplicity of [illegible].

2. Since there is no [illegible] between free-standing technical co-operation and technical [illegible] integrated in capital projects [illegible] and [illegible] respectively [illegible] - both terms are, in practice, used interchangeably and the term [illegible] was used during the meeting to cover both types.

3. The [illegible] recently [illegible] for project appraisal covering the whole process [illegible] to preparation, appraisal, selection and design [illegible] monitoring and evaluation. While these principles apply [illegible] members agreed to consider the applicability of [illegible] to technical co-operation projects. Reference will be made [illegible] Appraisal Principles (PAP) of particular relevance.

[illegible]

4. Successful development presupposes the [illegible] of institutional capacities. The responsibility for development projects - and therefore for

their preparation and implementation [illegible] with the developing countries. Technical co-operation aims at [illegible] developing countries to strengthen their human and institutional capacities in order to achieve self-reliance and sustainable development [illegible] by improving the prerequisites to their application. Although the importance of human and institutional development has been reaffirmed repeatedly, more needs to be done by donors and recipients together to address this central objective more effectively.

[illegible] Each national or local situation is unique and generalizations must be handled with care, but some major trends concerning its objectives emerge:

(a) The development of institutional [illegible] than individual capacities is a major objective. More emphasis should be given to institution-building and to the institutional framework of projects and programmes from the outset of activities. This implies an assessment of the implementing or operating agency's capacity to execute a project effectively, [illegible] assessment of the institutional environment [illegible] the project [illegible]. This aspect has been given particular [illegible] institutional assessment);

(b) Human resources development is a sine-qualitative [illegible] institution-building as well as TC, successful and [illegible] projects. Education and training at all levels are key areas of external support;

(c) Long-term institutional objectives should take priority over short-term specific project goals. In some cases, however, short-term operational objectives, such as direct support and transfer of technology, can be legitimate;

(d) In the years ahead, one of the major challenges will be to maintain and enhance the management capacity [illegible] governments. An efficient public sector is vital for development. There is [illegible] need for [illegible] help governments implement [illegible] programmes;

(e) Technical co-operation [illegible] aimed at strengthening private sector management since effective involvement of the private sector is essential to the development process; and

(f) More attention should be given to women, both as beneficiaries and partners in TC activities.

[illegible] Technical co-operation programming

6. The development of national technical and managerial capacities should form an integral part of the recipients' development planning process. Full involvement of recipient governments when planning and programming [illegible] is therefore necessary. Every effort should be made to utilize internal resources, and external TC should follow the [illegible] principle. A long-term perspective of co-operation is essential. Conditions/problems vary according

to the recipient and have to be fully taken into account. It should be recognized that a growing number of [illegible] and coordination [illegible].

[illegible]. [illegible]:

(a) A [illegible] should be designed with [illegible] long- and short-term objectives [illegible] where a genuine need has been articulated by the recipient authorities;

(b) A careful specification of [illegible] objectives is of crucial importance for effective operation [illegible]. Careful specification of objectives is also essential for monitoring and evaluation. Such objectives should be [illegible] articulated in terms of new capacities to be developed rather than in terms of inputs to be provided as has often been the case in the past;

(c) [illegible] and related to broad [illegible] development and [illegible] development. They should be included in programmes [illegible] and [illegible] requirements [illegible] and, if necessary, supported by undertaking a comprehensive assessment of [illegible] requirements with the participation of [illegible] including representatives from the [illegible] of the target group [illegible] should be ensured. [illegible] and [illegible] to the importance of [illegible] and co-ordination, including [illegible] among donors;

(d) Where a specific [illegible] recognition and strengthening. [illegible] should be [illegible] and support by the parties concerned. It is important that [illegible] activities [illegible];

(e) As regards [illegible] many of [illegible] principles should contribute to greater concern with sustainability and effective use of aid and recipient resources;

(f) It is essential to assess the cultural, social, economic, political and institutional environment in which [illegible] is to be implemented. The choice of appropriate technology [illegible] on the components of [illegible] package, in particular on the need for national or international inputs;

(g) The design of [illegible] should be based on a thorough analysis of the availability of local resources [illegible] financial, personnel and management [illegible].

[illegible]

9. This implies:

(a) The counterpart issue should be tackled at the level of structures and institutions rather than of individuals. When counterparts are appointed, every effort should be made to ensure their early availability and high quality and the efficient and continued use of them in the positions for which they were trained;

(b) Since the main objective of it is institution-building, the provision of expatriate technical assistance personnel for mainly project management purposes should be avoided wherever the most country personnel situation permits. Recipient governments should be informed of various options in order for them to choose the most advantageous one. When there are special donor conditions, they should be openly acknowledged and the reasons spelled out for transparency;

(c) Donors are invited to make greater use of local experts and consultants, especially when activities require a deep understanding of national and cultural factors. This could be fostered by better information on available local experts, flexibility in recruitment of experts and in the procurement of goods and services, decentralization of authority to field staff, and measures to encourage foreign consultancy firms to work with local consultancy firms;

(d) Government-supported volunteer programmes have made important contributions and still have a role to play, depending on the level of development in the recipient country. They can also foster international networks among youth and other groups committed to development. While traditional volunteer programmes are important, there are certain limitations to their impact since they mostly [illegible] people with limited professional experience. [illegible] programmes have an increasingly important role to play, especially in [illegible] development;

(e) Donors may consider alternative [illegible] on the [illegible], for instance, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local institutions and private sector organizations, not least where recipient governments have difficulties in providing adequate human and financial counterpart resources. NGOs provide important links to people at the grass-root level, whose involvement is essential for successful and sustainable development. It is likely that in the minuties the role of the private sector, whether funded or [illegible] a commercial basis, will be much larger. Donors should [illegible] appropriate to support for the proper management of these activities;

(f) Twinning arrangements have proved useful in achieving institutional development and transferring skills. Such arrangements may be promoted between various kinds of institutions, provided there is a match of goals and tasks, flexibility to meet changing needs, long-term commitment, mutual trust, and a willingness to adjust to local circumstances;

(d) Donors should consider recruiting nationals from other developing countries in their TC programmes and promoting TC among developing countries (TCDC). Providing recipients with funds for direct hiring of expertise has shown promising results;

(e) The efficiency of TC personnel could be enhanced through more careful and flexible recruitment, better preparation, improved technical back-stopping from headquarters and, above all, clear terms of reference (TORs). The TORs should be jointly defined with recipient authorities. They should outline, in detail, the long-term objectives and the roles and responsibilities of all parties involved, establish a time schedule, and, in the case of long-term contracts, be periodically reviewed with the recipient. Equally important is briefing experts on the local socio-economic, cultural, political and institutional conditions.

IV. Co-ordination

10. In line with the base and principles for TC co-ordination, central responsibility for aid co-ordination lies with each recipient government. There should be more effective and coordinated co-ordination of TC between recipient governments and donors at policy and operational levels to determine priorities and to decide on a division of roles and responsibilities between the parties concerned. This may reduce inter competition for scarce counterpart resources and contribute to optimal resource use. Increased co-ordination could provide a basis for more harmonized procedures.

11. This implies:

(a) Strengthening the government's capacity to plan and co-ordinate TC, the central ministry should always be involved in co-ordination and the ministries whenever relevant;

(b) Closer co-operation among donors at field level, particularly in sector and subsectoral co-operation. There is a real need for more co-ordination at the central country programming level. Donors should extend co-operation on thematic issues, such as women in development. TC commitments should be based on full information on what other donors are providing and on local expertise available. Donors may co-operate in making inventories of available local expertise;

(c) Technical co-operation needs and priorities as well as requirements for the development of effective recipient country management should be specified and discussed at consultative group/round-table meetings. Efforts should be made to associate NGO and private sector representatives involved in TC activities with local level TC co-ordination meetings;

(d) The multilateral agencies, particularly UNDP and the World Bank, have a special role to play in ensuring co-ordination and harmonization of donor TC practices at field level; and

(e) Co-ordination may include sharing evaluation and other major reports, undertaking joint evaluations and participating in the evaluation work of other donors.